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First Amendment Imperialism
Daniel J.H. Greenwood
The First Amendment threatens to swallow up all politics. In the manner
of classic social contract theory, First Amendment law asserts the separation
of the state from the most salient issues of democratic debate. Increasingly,
it acts as a bar to governmental action not just with regard to the issues of
conscience and religious practice with which it began, but far into the realm
of economic regulation we thought the courts had abandoned to the
legislatures after the Lochner' disaster.
Professor Walzer, in this insightful essay,2 offers a vision of separationism as the antidote to exclusionary cultural politics gone bad. And he is right.
But our First Amendment, here and now as applied in the courts, is more
often hostile to any politics at all than supportive of the engaged struggle to
create a common life that Professor Walzer celebrates. We need, I think,
more of Professor Walzer's separationism in politics-and less of the First
Amendment's abstention in law.
Walzer quite correctly points out that the First Amendment's separation
of church and state is only a special case of a larger disestablishment: not
only religions should be denied "coercive power," but also "racial and ethnic
groups, cultural communities, social movements, and even political parties."3
While legal doctrine often treats the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
as radically separate from each other and the Free Speech Clause, Walzer's
account of separationism suggests that we should place the entire Amendment
firmly in the core of the liberal effort to create a "civil society" separate from
the state. But we also need to restrain the First Amendment so that it protects
rather than displaces politics; we need to transform it from an individualistic

© Daniel J.H. Greenwood, ProfessorofLaw, University ofUtah CollegeofLaw. Thanks
to Professor Walzer, who showed me the difference between the problem of legitimacy and the
problem of peace, and to Robert Cover, z'l, who taught me the difference between worlds that
stand on Torah, work, and deeds of kindness, see Pirke Avot 1:2, TIM MISHNAH: A NEW
TRANSLATION 673 (Jacob Neusner trans., 1988), and those that stand on justice, truth, and
peace, see id. 1:18 at 675. This comment explores a First Amendment often seen as standing
on universal values of justice, sometimes on truth and, in my understanding of Walzer's talk,
on peace. But the particularisms of a set of historical traditions, peculiar modes of work, and
deeds of kindness to fellow countrymen cannot be avoided. For help in my own peculiar modes
of work, I owe thanks to many of my colleagues and especially to Karen Engle and Carol
Salem:
'Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2
See Michael Walzer, Drawingthe Line: Religionand Politics,1999 UTAHL. REV. 619.
3
1d. at 632.
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protector of a sphere of privacy into a political guarantor of decent collective
politics.
What is needed, then, is an account of the First Amendment as a
whole-as a unified program of separationism and limited government.
Considering the First Amendment in this way, it seems to me, helps not only
to illuminate the Amendment's effect on the specific debates Walzer
addresses (most especially, the role of politics and religion in the schools,
old-age homes, hospitals and similar social institutions) but also to understand First Amendment imperialism--its rapid expansion into areas long
thought impervious to constitutional law.
Classically, separation of church and state has been understood as the
epitome of the classic liberal approach-making politics safe by making it
trivial. Separation, on this view, stands for a demand that the government of
the people and by the people not define the people. It insists that the classic
goals of politics-defining a collective space, creating a people and a culture,
defining what makes us one and different from foreigners-are beyond the
bounds of our state. Non-liberal political theory has often emphasized those
aspects of law understood in the Greek concept nomos or the Hebrew
halakhah:the law, first and foremost, should concern itself with the creation
of a national way of life or a common culture.4 In contrast, the First
Amendment calls for governmental abstention, retreat, shrinking to make
space for civil society.5
Thus, Rousseau, attacking the thin liberal program, describes an ideal
legislator who imposes upon his citizens a "yoke of iron ... filling up every
moment of their lives" in order to "transform[] them into beings more than
merely human" by "distinctive usages," "exclusive and particular" religious
ceremonies, etc., to make them a distinctive nation that cannot be swallowed
up by another, or happy anywhere else.6 The First Amendment program is

4Nomos, the normative universe, is explored in Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.4 (1983). Halakhah, the
system of Jewish law, literally means "path" or "way of walking" and, indeed, Jewish law
classically saw its purview as extending to every aspect of life. In these and other pre-liberal
traditions, law encompassed what we would more likely refer to as culture, tradition, morality,
decency and even taste. The "culture wars" were the central task of politics, interest group
conflicts or the pursuit of efficiency a minor sideshow at best.
5
Compare the Kabbalistic doctrine of the tzimtzum--God's voluntary self-containment
necessary to make room for the world. See, e.g., GERSHOM SCHOLEM, SABBATAI SEvI: THE
MYSTICAL MESSIAH 29, 31 (1973) (describing tzimtzum).
6
JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND 7-11 (Willmoore Kendall
trans., 1985).
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quite different: let the law be limited, pale, abstract. Passion and particularity
are too dangerous, too likely to end in what Walzer calls "politics gone bad."7
This abstentious First Amendment is fundamentally anti-political, in that
it seeks to remove vast areas of human communal existence from the political
process. 8 The problem of culture is no longer to be the central question of
collective life but rather a private matter for individuals acting according to
their individual consciences. Or, for those whose religions require action in
community,9 or whose artists are more actively social participants in an
ongoing enterprise than the solitary geniuses of Romanticism, culture is to be
a product of people cooperating or interacting in civil society without benefit
of state support.
In a society that has become suspicious of politics and a legal culture
that tends to view political struggle as simply an unprincipled, unprofessional
and sloppy version of courtroom procedure, the First Amendment principle
of abstention has expanded beyond a program of making politics safe to
become a primary vehicle in a post-New Deal attempt to reduce the scope of
conscious collective control over the market. The First Amendment,
understood in this way as a fundamental limitation on the scope of government, has become the locus of a new Lochnerism-or rather, a revival of the
old Lochnerism under a new doctrinal label. The courts have increasingly
begun to use the First Amendment to restrict economic regulation and enforce
a vision of the market freed not from politics "gone bad," but rather from all
politics altogether.
Indeed, today the most important aspects of the First Amendment as
legal doctrine are not its restrictions on state establishment of churches or its
protections for political speech. The realities of coalition politics in a winnertake-all system of large single member districts would probably make
establishment at the federal level impractical in any event, while intra-

7

See Walzer, supra note 1, at 632.
Of course, I don't mean to mean to suggest that abstention is neutral, or inevitable, or
natural or pre-political or anything of that sort, nor am I suggesting that law is self-interpreting
or endowed with meanings apart from its political context. The anti-politics of the First
Amendment is also political, in the sense that it is the result of concrete political struggles over
the proper realm of democratic politics and legislative supremacy. By calling it anti-political,
I mean to claim that the separationist program seeks to replace a politics of popular debates,
coalition building, compromise and voting with, instead, law applied by judges attempting to
answer the question of the limits of government by interpretation of legal materials, seeking
to explicate "best meanings" rather than to create winning popular coalitions.
9
While First Amendment cases often seem to treat religion as an entirely individual affair,
the image of the solitary soul following the dictates of conscience is not natural for religions
that, for example, require prayer to be in public.
8
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governmental competition would limit it at the local level. It was not the First
Amendment that ended the blue laws." °
Similarly, recent First Amendment restrictions on state interference with
religious practices are of limited realistic significance: as cases such as

The Sunday blue laws, banning work, drinking and other activities on Sunday, have
declined from theirpeak in Puritan Massachusetts Bay to mere vestigial remnants, such as bans
on the sale of beer before noon. The courts, however, had little to do with this process: they
consistently found legally enforced Sunday observances to be something other than an
establishment of religion. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961)
(upholding statute that barred "profaning the Lord's Day" as secular in motive and effect and
stating that "scores" of cases had so held). But see Rogers v. State, 4 S.E.2d 918, 919-20 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1939) (upholding Sunday [sic!] laws on claimed authority of the Ten Commandments); Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 502 (1858) (holding California's Sunday law
unconstitutional for discriminating against Jews and Seventh-Day Adventists who view the
Fourth Commandment as binding), rev'd, Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678, 685 (1861)
(upholding similar law).
Similarly, the ending of legal disabilities on Catholics, Jews and other non-Protestants
has proceeded largely without assistance from the courts. Thus, the courts have upheld
apparent legal disabilities while the legislatures have overturned them. See, e.g., Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,510 (1986) (upholding military regulation requiring military officer
to remove his yarmulka in violation ofreligious law); Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213,213 (Pa.
1793) (imposing fine on witness who "refused to be sworn, because it was his Sabbath"); 10
U.S.C. § 744 (1988) (overruling Goldman); VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-343 (Michie 1996) (1849
statute exempting Jews from Sunday blue laws). See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 559 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that "legislatures apparently believed that
the appropriate response to conflicts between civil law and religious scruples was, where
possible, accommodation of religious conduct," but not citing much judicial accommodation).
The combination of repeated judicial holdings that Sunday and Christmas are secular
holidays with the view that minority practices are religious without regard for their meaning
within the minority culture has the consequence that governmental celebration of majority
holidays raises few First Amendment questions while recognition or accommodation of
minority traditions nearly always does. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679, 683
(1984) (holding that Christmas is "National Holiday" celebrated by western world and that
creche can be secular, with no discussion of status of members of nation who believe that a
mass celebrating the birth of Christian Messiah is a religious event and wish to celebrate it (or
not) as such). Compare, e.g., County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573, 643 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that Jewish symbols, like the Hanukkah menorah [sic: the
symbol in question was a nine-branched hanukkiah], are "indisputably" religious without
noting that Hanukkah, a festival celebrating a victory in a war of national liberation, is not a
"holy-day" (yontij) in the dominant Jewish tradition). The Court seems to take the view that
peculiar customs or needs of minority groups are necessarily religious, while religiously-based
customs of the majority are presumptively secular, thus making the Establishment Clause an
obstacle to encouraging the broadening of American self-definition to include all the nation.
For another example, see Bauchmanv. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254,268 (D. Utah 1995)
(treating Christian religious song as secular and Hebrew-language secular Israeli song as
religious).
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Kiryas Joel" and Employment Division v. Smith 2 demonstrate, the legislatures, by and large, have been more sympathetic to minority religions than the
courts. Nor have the courts been particularly protective of minorities when
the legislatures were not: Lukumi, not Reynolds, seems to be the outlier. 3 In
each of these areas, the primary protection for minorities is the political
culture of abstention-the fact that parties that propose to impose religious
or cultural uniformity upon us usually lose the election-not the legal
doctrines of the First Amendment. 4

"See Board of Educ. of Village of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705
(1994) (voiding as establishment New York Legislature's attempt to meet secular special
educational needs of Satmar Hasidic children). The New York Legislature repeatedly attempted
to avoid this decision. See 1994 N.Y. Laws (ch. 241), N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 1504 (McKinney
1988 & Supp. 1999) (allowing formation ofnew school district); Grumetv. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d
57 (1997) (invalidating 1994 version of § 1504); 1997 N.Y. Laws (ch. 390) (reenacting
modified version of§ 1504); Grumet v. Pataki, 675 N.Y.S.2d 662,666 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(invalidating 1997 version of§ 1504). In lightofthe Supreme Court's abandonment ofAguilar
v. Felton,473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled byAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 337 (1997), it
may now be possible to accommodate the Satmar needs administratively. The more serious
establishment problem Kiryas Joel raises is centrally within Walzer's understanding of a
broader separationism even when it is not doctrinally within the Establishment Clause: that is,
the treatment of minorities within any relatively homogeneous political unit. See, e.g.,
Waldman v. Village of Kiryas Joel, No. 97-C7506, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2824 at **4-5
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing challenge of "dissident" regarding "the pervasive and unconstitutional entwinement between secular and religious affairs in Kiryas Joel"); Kahal Charidim
Kiryas Joel v. Village of Kiryas Joel, 935 F. Supp. 450, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing
challenges to village's zoning ordinances by minority within minority).
2
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990) (upholding criminal ban
on use of peyote with no exception for religious use), overruled by OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992
(1993) (creating exception for religious peyote use). Congress attempted to overturn Smith
more generally by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb-2 to 2000bb-4. The Court held RFRA unconstitutional in Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
"3Compare Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
545-46 (1993) (protecting Santeria sacrifices against municipal ban), with Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-66 (1878) (refusing to protect Mormon polygamy against congressional ban in first U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment case); see alsoLyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,458 (1988) (permitting Forest Service, over its own
EIS objections, to pave road in Native American holy site); Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (upholding
criminal ban on use of peyote with no exception for religious use). Historically, as well, the
political culture ofdisestablishment has been more protective than the legal doctrine. Thus, for
example, the last recorded blasphemy case, Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 221
(1838), upheld the statute; the demise of this crime came at the hands of the executive and
legislative
branches.
14Sometimes, of course, the courts have made important contributions to the ongoing
debate on the proper meaning of political separationism and even led rather than trailed the
general political culture. See, e.g, West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) (protecting Jehovah's Witnesses' right not to say pledge of allegiance); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (overturning Regent's Prayer); School Dist. of Abington
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In contrast, the First Amendment is immensely important in purely
economic matters that may not seem to have anything to do with freedom of
speech or religion, but are critical limitations on the scope of politics.' The
Speech Clause of the First Amendment now bars most forms of campaign
finance reform, 6 requires that states permit price competition in sales of
pharmaceutical drugs, 7 requires states to allow advertising of out-of-state
commercial transactions that would be illegal if conducted in-state," restricts
anti-blockbusting regulation,' 9 requires allowing utilities to use rate-payers
money to promote increased energy use despite a governmental policy of
conservation," limits governmental regulation of guns and liquor,2' bars most
traditional State Bar bans on lawyer advertising, 2 requires cities to allow

Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,225-26 (1963) (striking down Lord's Prayer and Bible
readings as religious exercises in schools); cf. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 194:15-9 (1989) (1975
statute purporting to authorize recitation of Lord's Prayer in schools as "affirmation of
religious freedom"). But in the most controversial area-the public schools-the current modus
vivendi, a kind of watered down multiculturalism in which thin versions of many religions'
holidays are celebrated, was created outside the courts and seems at best questionable under
the separationism models the Court has promoted.
"5For commentary on the expansion of the commercial speech cases to encompass much
of the old economic due process results, see Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372,379-84 (1979); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process andthe FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L.
REV. 1, 40 (1979); David F. McGowan, A CriticalAnalysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL
L. REV. 359, 444-48 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of
the FirstAmendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181, 1193-95 (1988); Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation:Away from a GeneralTheory of the FirstAmendment,
78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1226-27 (1983).
6
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43, 44 (1976) (holding that spending money is
speech); compareYoung v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert.denied,
498 U.S. 984 (1990) (holding that begging for money is not speech).
"7 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
"See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,826-29 (1975) (overturning criminal conviction
for advertising abortion services in state where they were then illegal).
"'See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township ofWillingboro, 431 U.S. 85,98 (1977) (voiding
ban on residential "For Sale" signs).
2
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,569-72
(1980) (voiding New York's ban on utility promotion of increased use of electricity, adopted
during 1973 energy crisis).
"See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (restricting
liquor advertising ban); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,490-91 (1994) (voiding
ban on advertising malt liquor alcohol content); Nordyke v. Santa Clara County, 110 F.3d 707,
710-13 (9th Cir. 1997) (voiding contractual bar on gun shows).
2
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 650-53 (1985). But see
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,633-35 (1995) (upholding limited ban on lawyer
solicitation as time, place and manner regulation).
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businesses to install advertising-flyer distribution-stands on street corners, 23
limits libraries' evictions of people who use them as flop-houses,24 prevents
states from restricting corporations they create from lobbying (even if the
lobbying is effectively mandated by state corporate law),' limits the degree
to which New York City can regulate panhandling,2 6prevents California from
restricting commercial exploitation of the names of crime victims and
criminals,' and even prevents citizens from requiring milk companies to
disclose whether they are feeding cows artificial hormone supplements.2 8 If
the milk additive case is not a fluke, apparently all consumer protection acts
are constitutionally suspect, and if that is so, it is hard to see why much of the
civil rights acts and the entire securities regulatory scheme would not be as
29
well.
' 3See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430-31(1993)
(requiring that city treat advertising flyers as if they were as important as newspapers). The
First Amendment seems to require states to allow sidewalk news racks selling newspapers. See,
e.g., Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1207 (llth Cir. 1991). The two
rules together, then, mandate permitting advertising machines as well.
24
See Kriemer v. Bureau of Police, 765 F. Supp. 181, 197-98 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding that
library decorum rules violated First Amendment right of homeless man), rev'd,958 F.2d 1242,
1251-64 (3d Cir. 1992) (upholding library's rules only after lengthy First Amendment
analysis).
' See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,794-95 (1978) (overturning state statute
forbidding expenditures by business corporations to "influence[] the vote on referendum
proposals"); Consolidated Edison Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980)
(finding that "Commission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of
public policy directly infringes upon First Amendment freedom of speech rights"); see also
Daniel Greenwood, EssentialSpeech: Why CorporateSpeech Is Not Free,83 IOWA L. REv.
995 (1998) (arguing that even political speech by publicly traded corporations promotes no
First Amendment value).
26
See Loper v. New York Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
begging is a protected communicative activity subject to First Amendment protections and
cannotbebanned on city streets or parks); see also Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903
F.2d 146 (2d Cir.1990) (reversing decision by distinguished lower court judge that held that
panhandling in the subway was a protected First Amendment activity).
27
See Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Corp., 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
28
See International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that statute requiring purely factual disclosure of presence of milk from rBST treated
cows "contravenes core First Amendment values" because state had not sufficiently proven that
widespread consumer concern was well grounded); see also Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States
Dep't of Agriculture, 14 F.3d 429, 434 (9th Cir. 1993) (almond marketing program); United
States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1132-33 (3d Cir. 1989) (federal Beef Promotion & Research
Act), cert. denied,493 U.S. 1094 (1990); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 570 F.2d 157, 164 (1997) (right not to present anything but the "pro-egg" position).
29
The civil rights acts are centrally directed at limiting "expressive behavior" sending a
political message that certain groups are not full members of our political community. See, e.g.,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992) (overturning hate speech ordinance
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The Religion Clauses have not been quite as aggressively expansionist,
but the state RFRAs, assuming they are not held unconstitutional, seem likely
to change that history. Already, some courts have found that RFRA, its state
equivalents, or the Religion Clauses themselves restrict the degree to which
cities can protect historic buildings" and provide services to disabled
schoolchildren.3 1 One member of the Supreme Court has even suggested that
RFRA might preclude enforcement of civil rights acts.32 More will follow: we
have already seen, for example, claims that taxes violate religious
principles.33 No doubt there is a similar plaintiff for any other action a
legislature might take.
In each of these instances, the First Amendment as applied by the courts
displaces electoral politics in an area that has little to do with the struggles of
John Peter Zenger and William Pitt for political and legal freedom. The
Court's First Amendment requires that these political issues be left to
nonpolitical processes of civil society: only the market, not political struggle,
may decide how much liquor or legal advertising there will be or whether
milk manufacturers will honestly disclose the contents of their product. This
is abstention not to make politics safe but to destroy it altogether.
Justice Scalia ends his opinion in Boerne saying, "[S]hall it be the
determination of this Court, or rather of the people, whether [exceptions shall
be made to generally applicable laws for religious needs]. It shall be the
people. '34 But what he holds is that the meaning of the Establishment Clause
is beyond the rule of the people and indeed beyond the sphere of politics. The
First Amendment, in the name of preserving the underpinnings of political
self-government, is replacing politics with law.
Lochner, then, has returned. Once again, our Court is trying to solve the
problems of our joint economic life by interpreting the principles of liberal
abstention. But the rules of living together are too complicated for that:
interpretation asks what the First Amendment means, while we should be

because "the burning of a cross does express a message"). The securities regulation regime is
a pure example of prior restraint. If the First Amendment were applied fully to either of these
areas, existing law would be affected at least as radically as was libel law, see New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) or campaign contribution law, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), when the First Amendment reached them.
3
See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.2d 1352, 1355 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom City
of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
3
See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 693.
32
See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979,979 (1994) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that certiorari should have been granted).
33
See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equaiz., 493 U.S. 378, 384 (1990)
(claiming
that sales tax infringed on religious freedom to sell books).
34
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 2176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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asking, instead, how can we best live together in a world where some (but not
all) of us want to separate libraries and flop-houses, assure that the invisible
hand of the market motivates individuals to promote, not destroy, the public
good, or control corporations to preclude their becoming human creations that
coerce their creators needlessly and unthinkingly? The Court's First
Amendment stands in the way of this political struggle, by claiming that the
difficult compromises of political life can be avoided, independently of the
people concerned, as a matter of pure principle. By asking the wrong
question, it assures that we cannot reach the right answer.

Walzer, however, seeks not to abolish politics but to tame it. How then
is his abstention different from the classic liberal fence around politics the
Court has struggled to apply?
The First Amendment is sometimes viewed as a kind of equal protection
amendment for religions, requiring that religious individuals not be
discriminated against. Alternatively, it is viewed as creating a zone of privacy
for the individual conscience. Either view taps into a rich tradition of
controversy over issues such as the baseline from which equal treatment is to
be measured: How can the state be neutral in a world where the state and the
legal systems routinely interfere everywhere else? Or formal and substantive
equality: Is it enough that everyone be treated the same, or must different
people be treated differently? Both views tend, however, to be highly
individualistic, centering on the needs or rights of individuals taken quite
separately from the religious and cultural groups to which they belong.
Walzer' s analysis is particularly helpful in its reminder that the problem
of separation is centrally one of political coexistence, not merely philosophic
interpretation.35 Although he uses the language of individual rights, his
ultimate concern is best understood as not one of legal rights at all. It is,
rather, the issue of finality. The key to separationism, he tells us, is that
politics must be an ongoing process of negotiation, discussion, debate,
conflict, persuasion and controversy in which no resolution is reached and no
victory is allowed.36
In this political analysis, state neutrality is not to be understood as a
philosophic concept susceptible of precise definition or a legal principle
elucidated by logic and precedent. Rather, the issue is one of a political
culture-maintaining a space for today's winners to lose tomorrow. The
former view led straight to the imperialist First Amendment, in which

35

See Walzer, supra note 1, at 635, 638.
See id. at 637-38.

36
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abstention functions to force us to abandon the effort to tame the less pleasant
aspects of a market economy in the name of individualism; the latter leads to
a different First Amendment, designed to promote a politics of inclusion.
This is not a rights argument at all. Victorious political movements,
Professor Walzer tells us, may enact their program but not their party; so too
religions.3 7 The disestablishment principle, in this broad form, is the
grounding of the democratic system, perhaps the most centrally important
part of the Constitution-the Republican Form of Government Clause made
operational 38-and yet virtually unenforceable except in the consciences of
the victors.39
It is, instead, an argument directed to victorious groups, telling them to
remember not to treat their opponents as Satanic threats to civilization or
even representatives of all that is wrong in society-even when they are
wrong-but rather as fellow members of a common enterprise. Ultimately,
it is only that understanding of fellowship-not legal rights, court-enforced
neutrality, or even traditional morality-that will keep us from the "politics
gone bad" of the Wars of Religion or their twentieth-century equivalents.
American and South African apartheid alike survived in the face of welldeveloped legal and moral systems; even the ultimate horrors of Nazi
Germany were rather more supported than resisted by judges and church
leaders. Once groups were defined out of membership, legal rights did them
no good: slaves were property, Jews were vermin, and no legal system is
organized to support slaves or vermin.
The key to Walzer's vision, it seems to me, is found in this concept of
membership. Organizations, nations and societies all distinguish between
members and outsiders. Outsiders are treated as means to be exploited: they
are inputs to be used as efficiently as possible to get as much out of them as
possible. When inputs get more, the organization has less: think of the normal
way that business corporations think of their employees or suppliers. But
members cannot be treated that way. A member is not an input but an end in
itself: when members are better off, the organization is better off. The key,
then, to decent politics is to ensure that when we refer to "us," or "we," or the
"nation," we are referring to all of us. That all of the formal citizens (and
perhaps all the inhabitants, or even more) of the country are treated as
members whose welfare the state seeks to maximize, not as outsiders to be
exploited for the benefit of members. And that the state (and we, in our roles
as voters, debaters and citizens) takes all of us to be ends not means.

id. at 634.
U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4.
Witness the abject failure of the courts to restrict political gerrymandering except by
the most formalistic of rules.
17See
38
See
39
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This vision of separationism as directed to maintaining a sense of mutual
membership in a common enterprise is quite different from the more common
view of separation as creating a sphere from which government is excluded.
Walzer's explanation has a major advantage over the leading legal theories
of the First Amendment: it explains one of the most puzzling aspects of
existing doctrine-the radical dichotomy between the treatment of religion
in the schools and elsewhere. The state routinely provides funds for churchrun hospitals and old-age homes, even when they are pervasively religious.
At the same time, even seemingly trivial subsidies to church schools are
problematic and often held unconstitutional. Neither of the leading legal
theories explain this distinction: on the "wall between church and state"
model, the payments to church hospitals and old-age homes seem clearly
improper, regardless of whether or not the details of the Lemon test are
applied.' Similarly, on the equal protection model, the school cases are
clearly wrong, since they sanction clear preference for secular private (and
public) schools relative to religious ones (and certainly treat parents who
wish to send their children to religious schools far worse than those who
prefer public schools).
Walzer, in contrast, offers a clear justification for treating schools
differently: they-but not the adult and especially the end-of-life institutions-raise the spectre of a movement invoking the state to perpetuate
itself.4 From the perspective of the liberal privatization theory of abstention,
though, Walzer's answer only raises a further puzzle. The First Amendment
as conventionally understood is a list of bans on governmental action, areas
excluded from political struggle and left to civil society. The logic of the First
Amendment, then, offers a clear and simple answer to the problem of
"finality" in the schools: privatize them, by a voucher system universally and
equally available to all students and all schools. Taxpayers would still
support education, of course, but they should do so according to the norms of
the First Amendment: by creating an open forum. The state would be out of
the business of impressing ideologies on young minds and politics would be
tamed, if not entirely eliminated, as the issue of how to educate the next
generation went the way of the established church. Neither kulturkampfs nor
fits of spite would mar our educational politics.
Privatized schools, like the church-run nursing homes Walzer endorses,
would come in many flavors. Domination by one group would be virtually
impossible: if a group imposed a catechism in its schools, all those parents (or
older children) who dislike the specifics, or catechisms generally, would
'See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (setting out four-part test for
when wall of separation between church and state has been breached).
determining
4
QSee Walzer, supra note 1, at 635-36.
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simply leave. The market would assure both a variety and, one can safely
assume, not too many too strict catechisms.
Walzer does not address vouchers, except indirectly and by a counterproposal: church schools, he says, should not be supported by state funds
when they are teaching church (or ethnic) doctrine, but, he notes, he could
imagine clerics coming into the public schools to teach religion (and
presumably ethnicity).4 2 Now, this is precisely contrary to current First
Amendment doctrine, which seems far more likely to accept voucher-funded
private schools than officially hired church educators in the state schools.
Why does he come out this way?
Walzer's transformation of abstention into a tool to promote, not ban,
politics provides an answer, I think. Privatizing school would, it seems to me,
predictably worsen, not improve, our political life.
First, private schools will naturally be led by those most committed to
the particular particularisms of each school. Those who care most about
sectarianism are those most likely to teach it. The result will be a large
increase in the number of children exposed to extreme versions of the various
sectarian particularisms that make up the American people.43
In contrast, the danger in our public schools is mush, not sectarianism.
Public schools must find one curriculum that fits all, or at least does not
evoke too much protest. The inevitable tendency is to drive out the extremists
and purists (they can go to private school), leaving the moderates to find
some meeting point in the mushy middle. Vouchered private schools would
each educate deeply to some particular American sectarianism; public schools
have jumped at the thinnest variety of multiculturalism- on Tuesday we do
one sub-culture and on Wednesday another, all stripped of anything that
might make them offensive or too difficult to understand.
Public school multicultural mush is not the best way to get a deep or
critical education. But it does tend to reduce our cultural differences, or at
least to accustom our children to finding the common elements. Segregated
as our public schools are, it is nonetheless hard, at least in the city schools,
not to meet parents and children from significantly different backgrounds. In
class together for four or six years, we have little choice but to find ways of

42

See id. at 636 n.33.
Something similar to this seems to have happened in the religious (public) schools in
Israel, where the first generation of teachers came from backgrounds well to the political and
religious right of the parents who sent their children. When the children came to maturity, their
views were far closer to those of their teachers than to their parents. See generally SEFI
43

RACHLEVSKY, HAMORO SHEL MASHIAH [MESsIAH's DONKEY] (1998) (discussing rise of

Messianic extremism in Israel).
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coexistence. That experience is the beginning of the decent politics Walzer
seeks. Vouchered private schools would eliminate this training ground.
Neither avoiding coercion nor abstention nor even Walzer's fear of
finality can justify the public schools. Funding students rather than schools
would be less coercive, at least to the parents, since they would be able to
pick the schools they want. The children probably would be exposed to more
religiously, ideologically or culturally charged schools than today, but it does
not seem sensible to call this coercion: the concept of ideological or cultural
coercion makes little sense applied to children who do not yet have a formed
ideology. The resulting plethora of fissiparous sectarianisms, perhaps more
thickly understood than today's, would be unlikely to create a self-perpetuating finality. Anarchy and chaos, not the totalitarianism Walzer fears, seem
more likely.
The justification is, rather, the value of affiming our common membership. If we seek to live together, we should put in the effort to build a
common school system, making the compromises necessary to keep both our
religious and nonreligious, culturally committed and assimilationist, families
in the system. The voucher model is an American version of the Ottoman
Millet system, in which different communities lived side by side but did not
interact. A political community should aspire to more.
But building a common school system means compromise. And in the
current reality of the United States, it probably must include some compromises that the Supreme Court has barred. We cannot return to the bad old
days in which one religious group was able to define its particular customs
and practices as neutral; rather, we must find spaces for many differences to
come into the schools. Watered down it will inevitably be: there is not time
in the school day for anything else. Perhaps, as Walzer suggests," it should
include bringing different religions into the schools for different kids, or
comparative religion study for all, or in the more conventional American
approach, coordinated release time. The key is to find a solution that more of
us can live with, and to find it in the world of friendship, not abstract
principles.
More generally, this understanding of separationism can point the way
to a different First Amendment: one that promotes politics instead of
displacing it."5 Freedom of speech and religion should be seen as foundations

'See Walzer, supra note 1, at 636 n.33.
45
I've tried to apply this political understanding of abstention to a different issue, not
conventionally understood as arising under the First Amendment but clearly closely related,
in an article on the abortion problem. See Daniel Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin'sDominions:
Investments, Memberships, The Tree ofLife andthe Abortion Question,72 TEXAs L. REv. 559
(1994) (arguing for political, rather than principled, solution).
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for a political project of finding a way to live together based in real dialogue,
not as philosophic or legalistic alternatives to messy compromises. We should
embrace separationism to make politics safe, but not to pretend that we can
make ourselves safe from politics, for living together always involves
conflicts of values that cannot be avoided by false neutrality.
Justice, it turns out, is both too much-we cannot achieve it for everyone
short of the messianic era-and too little. What we need is mutual concern.

